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Is Misdemeanor Cash Bail an
Unconstitutional Excessive Fine?
Barnett J. Harris*
Abstract
“[H]ere we are in 2018 . . . still litigating incorporation of the Bill of
Rights. Really? Come on . . . .”
– Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch1
“[O]ur bail system—excuse the expression—is totally ass-backwards in
every respect.”
– New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman2
The Excessive Fines Clause is one of the least developed clauses
pertaining to criminal procedure in the Bill of Rights. In fact, the Supreme
Court has only interpreted the Clause a few times in its entire history. Yet,
on any given day, hundreds of thousands of people languish in jails without
having been convicted of anything, because most of these people are unable
to meet the bail amount a judge sets.
This Essay examines the surprisingly under-explored relationship
between misdemeanor cash bail & pretrial detention and the Excessive
Fines and Excessive Bail Clauses of the Eighth Amendment, using the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019)
as an inroad into the broader topic. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Timbs held that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states, thus
* J.D. 2021, Georgetown University Law Center; A.B. 2017, University of Delaware. I owe
thanks to those whose scholarship inspired me to jump into the conversation and share thoughts of
my own: Peter Edelman, Crystal Yang, Alexandra Natapoff, Shima Baradaran Baughman, Samuel
Wiseman, Beth Colgan, Lauryn Gouldin, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson.
1. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 32, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S.Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091).
2. Jillian Jorgensen, New York State’s Top Judge: Bail System ‘Totally Ass-Backwards in Every
Respect,’ OBSERVER (June 16, 2015, 8:39 PM), https://observer.com/2015/06/a-push-to-reformbackwards-bail-system-after-kalief-browders-death/.
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constitutionally limiting governmental authority to impose economic
sanctions. However, it may have done more than that. Since that decision,
the line between a legitimate state interest and a punitive economic sanction
in misdemeanor bail decisions is blurred, raising the interesting question of
what makes a bail determination reasonable. This Essay sets out a few
conceptions of the relationship between bail determinations and excessive
fines, then shows how those conceptions flow naturally from the rationale of
Timbs.
The Essay concludes that the Constitution demands more
protections for the accused at bail hearings, and the current system in many
states fails constitutional scrutiny.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a prosecution in the state of Virginia for trespass, a
misdemeanor.3 The facts are as follows. John Creasy was too tired to drive
home one night after work, and a friend who lived close by invited him over
and instructed him to come up to the apartment when he arrived. However,
on his way there, his phone lost power. He made it to the lobby of his
friend’s apartment shortly after midnight but was stopped by a police officer
who was patrolling the area and spotted him walking into the building. The
officer inquired what he was doing there so late, yet the officer did not
believe the story and arrested John for criminal trespass.4
The only question in the case is legal: Did John Creasy, “without
authority of law,” go upon and remain on the “premises of [his friend’s
apartment building] after having been forbidden to do so.”5 After two nights
in jail, he was brought before a judge. The entire hearing lasted four
minutes. The prosecutor asked for release conditioned on posting of bail
and, without inquiring into John’s financial circumstances, the judge deemed
him safe to return to the community but granted the prosecutor’s request and
set bail at $10,000—an amount well beyond John Creasy’s ability to pay.6
Before remanding Mr. Creasy to jail, the judge cautioned him:
Due to a significant backlog of cases due to the COVID-19
pandemic, your next appearance will not be for at least six weeks.
3. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-119 (West 2011) (“If any person without authority of law goes upon or
remains upon the lands, buildings or premises of another, or any portion or area thereof, after having
been forbidden to do so, either orally or in writing, by the owner, lessee, custodian, or the agent of
any such person . . . shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”).
4. See, e.g., Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant, THE ATLANTIC Sept. 2017,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/
(“As
prosecutors have accumulated power in recent decades, judges and public defenders have lost it. To
induce defendants to plead, prosecutors often threaten “the trial penalty”: They make it known that
defendants will face more-serious charges and harsher sentences if they take their case to court and
are convicted.”).
5. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-119 (2011).
6. Throughout this paper I will be referencing “cash bail,” also known as “secured money bail.”
Cash bail is the process where a defendant pays either the full bond amount or a percentage of the
bond amount into a registry of a court, which may be refunded at the end of the case if the defendant
makes all appearances (whether or not found guilty). In most states, that percentage is 10%. See
Kellen Funk, The Present Crisis in American Bail, 128 YALE L.J. F. 1098, 1114 (2019) (discussing
the basic parameters of the secured money bail system). So, in this example, John would have to
pay $1,000.00 to be released pending trial.
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Further, in my courtroom, defendants are not given counsel at bail
hearings if they cannot afford to hire their own attorney. Moreover,
I do not know when you will be appointed a lawyer, as there is
serious demand for their services for cases that take precedent over
misdemeanors. However, you can—and in fact, I encourage you—
to work this out with the prosecutor sooner rather than later.
An hour later, the prosecutor called with a plea deal: “You can get out
today, and only have to pay a fine of $150.00. However, if you take this to
trial, I will seek the maximum sentence if convicted.”7 Mr. Creasy took the
deal, even though his conduct could not possibly have constituted criminal
trespass, as he had been invited by the owner. 8
Putting all other possible issues to the side, did the judge violate Mr.
Creasy’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from punitive economic
sanctions?9
The Supreme Court recently held that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on
excessive fines applies to the states.10 In Timbs v. Indiana, Tyson Timbs
pled guilty to two charges.11 After he was sentenced, the State of Indiana
sought to seize his Land Rover worth $42,000—a value which was roughly
four times that of the $10,000 maximum criminal fine available.12 The trial
court held that forfeiture of the Land Rover “would be grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of Timbs’s offense, [and] hence
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.” 13
The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Excessive Fines

7. See Yoffe supra note 4 (discussing the “trial penalty”).
8. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff WHY INNOCENT PEOPLE PLEAD GUILTY (explaining that
prosecutorial discretion and the use of negotiation tactics often result in guilty pleas).
9. The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
10. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686–87 (2019). Before Timbs, the only rights not fully
incorporated were “(1) the Third Amendment . . . ; (2) the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury indictment
requirement; (3) the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases; and (4) the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765
n.13 (2010); see also Browning–Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
276 n.22 (1989) (declining to decide whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states).
11. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686.
12. State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179, 1181 (Ind. 2017).
13. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686.
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Clause did not apply to the states.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed, holding that the clause does apply to the states. 15
Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg began by detailing
how the Excessive Fines Clause traces its lineage to the Magna Carta, which
guaranteed that an individual “shall not be [fined] for a small fault, but after
the manner of the fault.”16 She proceeded to note how this protection was
needed because, for centuries, authorities abused their power to impose
fines.17 The Court concluded by noting that protection from “punitive
economic sanctions” by way of the Excessive Fines Clause was established
to shield the people from governmental overreach.18
In light of the Court’s recent decision in Timbs, this Essay explores
whether and how the Excessive Fines Clause might apply to the most
common misdemeanors, specifically pretrial detention for these
misdemeanor offenses. This Essay argues that the system of pretrial
detention in most states, as it currently operates, violates the Excessive Bail
and Excessive Fines Clauses of the Eighth Amendment.19 Rulings
concerning bail and the process by which judges make such rulings have
constitutional ramifications. The right to be free from punitive economic

14. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d at 1183–84 (“Given the lack of clear direction from the Supreme Court, we
have a couple of options. One option is to ignore McDonald and follow the lead of some courts that
have either applied the Excessive Fines Clause to challenged state action or assumed without
deciding that the Clause applies. . . . A second option is to await guidance from the Supreme Court
and decline to find or assume incorporation until the Supreme Court decides the issue
authoritatively. We choose this latter . . . .”).
15. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687 (Timbs holding).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 688. Justice Ginsburg noted that the Excessive Fines Clause was created to “limit[] the
government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some
offense.” Id. at 687 (quoting United States v. Bajakaijan, 524 U.S. 321, 327–28 (1998); see also id.
at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting, for example, that the English Star Chamber “imposed heavy
fines on the king’s enemies”).
18. Id. at 689; see also id. at 696 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the Eighth Amendment is
“an admonition” against “arbitrary reigns” by the government).
19. See infra Part IV. This applies both to states which use judicial discretion, where the bail is
set by judges based on what they perceive to be sufficient; as well as states which use a fixed bail
schedule, where a dollar amount is set for every crime ex-ante—so the only thing that matters is the
nature of the offense charged. Nicholas P. Johnson, Cash Rules Everything Around the Money Bail
System: The Effect of Cash-Only Bail on Indigent Defendants in America’s Money Bail System, 36–
37 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 29, 50–54 (2019). Additionally, eight states require cash-only bail, which
means the defendant must pay the entire amount of bail in cash to be released before trial. Id. at 56–
57.
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sanctions and the prohibition against excessive bail in the pretrial detention
context are coterminous—to enjoy one freedom, you must have the other.
The Constitution prohibits jailing people simply because they are poor,20 and
the Supreme Court recently held that punitive economic sanctions are
“excessive fines” for Eighth Amendment purposes.21 These decisions offer
important protections for misdemeanor defendants and implicate vital
societal interests. So, when the state tells John Creasy “you can go home as
long as you pay a lot of money,” and then jails him when he cannot afford to
pay—it violates both protections.22
In a world where nonviolent conduct—that which does not involve
damage to property or injury to persons, and indeed is often trivial in nature,
such as unbuckled seatbelts, a noisy muffler, or an unleashed dog—can land
anyone in jail, judges abuse their discretion when they set bail so high that it
constitutes a de facto detention order, rendering punishment before
conviction.23 And while pretrial detention is supposed to be the “carefully
limited exception,”24 pretrial detention is very much the norm, particularly
for those charged with misdemeanors.25 On any given day, nearly half a
20. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983) (holding that courts must inquire into a
person’s reason for failure to pay court-mandated fines before revoking probation, so that indigent
people are not unjustly incarcerated)
21. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed
. . . .”). Pretrial detention not only impairs a fundamental right, but it also impairs the ability to
secure numerous other fundamental rights. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (noting that the
“traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense and
serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction. Unless this right to bail before
trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose
its meaning.” (citation omitted)). Under the Excessive Fines Clause, a fine is excessive if it deprives
an individual of his livelihood and he does not have the ability to pay it. See Browning-Ferris
Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 271 (1989) (Citing the Magna
Carta in holding that fines may not be so large as to deprive a person of his livelihood). Similarly,
under the Excessive Bail Clause, pretrial liberty is the norm, and bail is excessive if it arbitrarily
keeps a person in jail because they have no ability to pay it. See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4–7 (“Bail set at
a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to [provide adequate assurance that the accused
will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty] is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth
Amendment.”).
23. See Florence v. Cnty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 346–47 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
see also Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1730 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that “criminal laws have grown so exuberantly and come to cover so much
previously innocent conduct that almost anyone can be arrested for something.”).
24. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
25. Léon Digard & Elizabeth Swavola, Justice Denied: The Harmful and Lasting Effects of
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million people sit in jail simply because they have been accused of a crime
and are too poor to pay bail.26 For indigent misdemeanor offenders, bail
operates as an unconstitutional excessive fine because it punishes poverty
and deprives individuals of their livelihood. Timbs requires more procedural
and substantive protections.
Part II outlines the Supreme Court’s decisions involving bail. 27 Part III
discusses the history of adopting the Excessive Bail and Excessive Fines
Clauses.28 Part III also outlines the influences that shaped the Framers in
including these Clauses in the new constitutional framework and discusses
the Clause’s interpretation and application in early American History. 29 Part

Pretrial
Detention,
VERA
INST.
OF
JUST.
2
(2019),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/Justice-Denied-Evidence-Brief.pdf. 2019 marked a
30% increase in the size of the pretrial detainee population over the last twenty years; yet over this
same period, the number of convicted individuals declined, meaning that the entire net growth can
be attributed to pretrial detainees. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole
Pie, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE n.3 (2020) (noting that the “not convicted” population of jails is the
group driving jail growth), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html; Zhen Zeng, Jail
Inmates in 2016, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 4 (2018) (noting that at midyear 2000, nearly 350,000
individuals being held in jails were pretrial detainees), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji16.pdf;
Zhen Zeng, Jail Inmates in 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 5 (2021) (noting that at midyear 2019, nearly
490,000
individuals
being
held
in
jails
were
pretrial
detainees),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji19.pdf; Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting
Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 501 n.15 (2012) (noting that over the last “two decades, local jails
have housed more pretrial detainees than actual convicts”). Misdemeanors represent roughly 80% of
all state criminal dockets. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR
MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 2
(2018) [hereinafter NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME].
26. Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 25. In the United States, there are nearly 11 million
misdemeanor charges filed every year. NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME, supra note 25,
at 40–41;cf. JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE 21–22 (1979) (describing bail’s impact on poor defendants); Robert Lewis, No
Bail Money Keeps Poor People Behind Bars, WNYC NEWS (Sep. 19, 2013),
https://www.wnyc.org/story/bail-keeps-poor-people-behind-bars/ (highlighting how the number of
pretrial detainees hovers around 50,000 individuals in New York City alone annually); Bernadette
Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Detaining the Poor: How Money Bail Perpetuates an Endless Cycle of
Poverty
and
Jail
Time,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
1
(2016),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/DetainingThePoor.pdf. Because the right to pretrial freedom
from physical restraint is fundamental, the Constitution constrains when the state can intrude on such
a fundamental right—including by way of unaffordable cash bail. See U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
751 (1987) (acknowledging that an individual has a “strong interest in liberty” from pretrial physical
restraint but holding that pretrial detention does not violate a fundamental right).
27. Infra Part II.
28. Infra Part III.
29. Infra Part III.

80

[Vol. 2021: 73]

Is Misdemeanor Cash Bail an
Unconstitutional Excessive Fine?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

IV argues that the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive cash bail as
applied to poor individuals in misdemeanor cases.30 Thus, cash bail may be
imposed only in the rare circumstances which require it after an adequate
assessment is taken by the presiding judge. Part V concludes that the
Constitution affords more protections for individuals accused of
misdemeanors, and judges must take additional steps before imposing bail. 31
II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: A BRIEF
REVIEW
The concept and application of bail and pretrial release have historical
roots dating back long before this great nation was formed.32 In more recent
times, however, the practice has gone astray, resulting in a system of abuse
30. Infra Part IV.
31. Infra Part V.
32. Medieval England had bail as a mechanism to free “untried prisoners.” See DANIEL J. FREED
& PATRICIA M. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1964); see also Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., The
Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 329
(1982); Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that the “right to be free from
excessive bail . . . belongs to those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of our civil and political institutions.’” (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)));
Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 967–75 (1965).
Massachusetts was the first territory in the United States to recognize a right to bail in its Body of
Liberties, dating to 1641, which held: “No mans person shall be restrained or imprisoned . . . before
the law hath sentenced him thereto.” Ariana K. Connelly & Nadin R. Linthorst, The
Constitutionality of Setting Bail Without Regard to Income: Securing Justice or Social Injustice?,
10 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 115, 118 (2019) (alteration in original); see also Timothy R. Schnacke
et al., The History of Bail and Pretrial Release, PRETRIAL JUST. INSTITUTE 4 (2010),
https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ccjj/Committees/BailSub/Handouts/HistoryofBail-Pre-TrialReleasePJI_2010.pdf. The United States eventually adopted a surety system from these roots where a
respectable person would take personal responsibility for the accused and promise to pay the
required money if the individual failed to show up. Timothy R. Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail: A
Resource Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and a Framework for American Pretrial Reform,
NATIONAL
INSTITUTE
OF
CORRECTIONS
25
(2014),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/
028360.pdf; see also Connelly & Linthorst, supra note 32, at 118–19; Schnacke et al., supra, at 4–5.
States would take a liberal approach to the right to bail and pretrial release in most instances—some
going so far as to have a presumption that defendants would be released pending trial. June
Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the
Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 531–32 (1983); see also Bail: An Ancient
Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 967 (1961). Historically, this right has acted as a
protection from governmental overreach. See Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and
Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 909, 916–20. These protections became known as the
Consensus Right to Bail. Id. at 921–23.
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with little oversight and serious societal impacts. Depending on the state,
courts impose secured cash bail through two mechanisms: judicial discretion
and fixed bail schedule.33 For states that use a fixed schedule, a dollar
amount is set for every crime ex-ante, thus the only thing that matters is the
nature of the offense charged.34 For states that use judicial discretion, judges
set the bail based on what they perceive to be sufficient.35 There are also
eight states which require cash-only bail, meaning that, in these states, the
defendant must pay the entire amount of bail in cash to be released before
trial.36
Over the years, the Supreme Court has given very little attention to bail.
In fact, the first time the Supreme Court addressed bail was over one
hundred fifty years after the Eighth Amendment was ratified, in Stack v.
Boyle.37 In Boyle, a dozen individuals were charged with being Communist
sympathizers.38 The lower court judge set bail at $50,000—the equivalent of
over $500,000 today.39 The accused individuals sought to reduce the
amount, arguing the bail amount violated the Excessive Bail Clause when
taking account of their financial abilities at the time.40 The District Court for
the Southern District of California denied the applications and the Ninth

33. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Harris Cnty., 892 F.3d 147, 153–54 (5th Cir. 2018) (fixed bail
schedule); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (judicial discretion).
34. Johnson, supra note 19, at 50–51 (discussing how judges in states with fixed bail schedules
often fail to consider factors like the defendant’s ability to pay). But see O’Donnell, 892 F.3d at 153
(explaining that, even with a fixed bail schedule, judges in Texas “are legally proscribed from
mechanically applying the bail schedule to a given arrestee,” and that “the Texas Code requires
officials to conduct an individualized review based on five enumerated factors . . . .”).
35. Connelly & Linthorst, supra note 32, at 125–26 (discussing secured money bail’s contours).
36. Johnson, supra note 19, at 56–57. But see Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 (“the modern practice of
requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional
assurance of the presence of an accused. Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.”); Trujillo v. State,
483 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Ark. 2016) (“In Arkansas, like Wyoming, we have held that the purpose of
bail is to ensure the presence of the defendant.”); Saunders v. Hornecker, 344 P.3d 771, 780 (Wyo.
2015) (“This Court has stated that the purpose of bail in Wyoming is to ensure the defendant’s
presence to answer the charges without excessively restricting the defendant’s liberty pending
trial.”); Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV.
837, 849–50 (2016).
37. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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Circuit affirmed the denial.41 The Supreme Court disagreed.42 The Court
vacated the bail amount, concluding that any amount of bail “set at a figure
higher than an amount reasonably calculated to [give adequate assurance to
the individual that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty]
is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.”43 The Court gave the
following reason: “[The] traditional right to freedom before conviction
permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the
infliction of punishment prior to conviction. Unless this right to bail before
trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries
of struggle, would lose its meaning.”44 That presumption, the Court noted,
will mean that generally the individual will be entitled to pretrial freedom,
which will permit “the unhampered preparation of a defense . . . and
serv[ing] to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction.”45 Just
a few months later, the Court revisited bail, in Carlson v. Landon.46 Carlson
dealt with the issue of whether individuals who pose a flight risk could be
held without bail at all.47 The Court asserted for the first time that the Eighth
Amendment only requires bail not to be excessive—it does not guarantee
bail in all circumstances.48 Individuals charged with certain crimes—such as
capital offenses—need not be granted bail at all.49 Yet if they are granted
bail, it cannot be excessive—and excessiveness is to be determined on an
individualized basis.50
The last time the Court spoke on bail was over three decades ago in
United States v. Salerno.51 In Salerno, Anthony Salerno, boss of the
Genovese crime family, was indicted on a slew of serious charges, including
41. Stack v. Boyle, 192 F.2d 56, 57 (9th Cir. 1951).
42. Stack, 342 U.S. at 7.
43. Id. at 5.
44. Id. at 4.
45. Id.
46. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
47. Id. at 526–28.
48. Id. at 545.
49. Id.
50. See Stack, 342 U.S. at 5.
51. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). In 1984, Congress supplemented these cases when it enacted the Bail
Reform Act of 1984, which added the determination of dangerousness to be included in the inquiry
to setting bail. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c). Congress was worried about “the alarming problem of crimes
committed by persons on release,” and thus wanted to allow judges to use their discretion in
determining bail. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3 (1983).
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racketeering.52 At issue in Salerno was whether danger to the community
alone provides a legitimate reason for denying bail.53 The Court concluded
that the Constitution does not prohibit an arrestee from being detained
pending trial “if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing
evidence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions ‘will
reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the community.’”54
These three cases highlight the Court’s view that pretrial release is an
important liberty interest.55 The only reasons to detain someone before trial
is if they are a flight risk, pose a danger to society or the community, or
some combination of the two.56 Wealth-based pretrial detention, however,
does not rest on either of these reasons, and thus this practice fails to find
constitutional grounding.
III. NAVIGATING THE BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS: THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
A. History of The Excessive Bail Clause
It is hard to understand contemporary debates about bail without going
further back through the history of what would become the Eighth
Amendment. The Excessive Bail Clause traces its origins all the way to the
Magna Carta, the foundation of English law.57 After adopting the Magna

52. Id. at 743.
53. Id. at 744–45.
54. Id. at 741 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (alteration in original)).
55. Cf. Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 780–88 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that
Arizona’s Proposition 100, which categorically denied bail to any undocumented persons awaiting a
felony trial, violated the liberty interest of the substantive due process clause); Schultz v. State,
330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1358 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (“Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to
pretrial liberty . . . absent extenuating circumstances like flight risks or dangers to the community,
the State may not incarcerate a defendant pretrial.”).
56. See, e.g., Schultz, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 1358.
57. See Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 270–
71 (1989) (noting that the Magna Carta established that fines may not be so large as to deprive a
person of his livelihood); English Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.)(“That excessive bail
ought not to be required . . . .”); Foote, supra note 32, at 965–66; CHARLES PETERSDORFF, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BAIL IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 483 (1824);
Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984: The Loss of the Core
Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 121, 127 (2009)
[hereinafter Wiseman, Bail Reform Act].
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Carta, Parliament sought to “implement the promise of the famous 39th
chapter of Magna Carta that ‘no freeman shall be arrested, or detained in
prison . . . unless . . . by the law of the land.’”58 For the next few centuries,
further developments established firm protections for bail.59
Routine abuses occurred because the common law of 1689 afforded
courts very broad discretion in setting bail.60 These abuses led to the
enactment of the Excessive Bail Clause in the English Bill of Rights. 61 The
clause sought to firmly close loopholes which allowed judges to circumvent
the will of Parliament—that pretrial release is the norm save for exceptional
circumstances.62 63
Soon after the English Bill of Rights became law, the courts of the
King’s Bench began to examine whether individuals had the ability to post
bond.64 Commentators noted that to be reasonable, bail must consider the
financial ability of the individual.65 This history shows that policing abusive
pretrial imprisonment through the Excessive Bail Clause was a fundamental

58. Foote, supra note 32, at 965–66 (alteration in original).
59. FREED & WALD, supra note 32, at 1; Foote, supra note 32, at 966–68. Difficulties in
securing release on bail led Parliament to create the Petition of Right of 1628. Foote, supra note 32,
at 967. However, there was no strong mechanism to force judges to set timely bail and release
hearings. Foote, supra note 32, at 967. This led to Parliament enacting the Habeas Corpus Act of
1679, which could force the setting of bail hearing. Foote, supra note 32, at 967. However, this led
to judges setting bail at unreasonably high levels so that individuals would remain detained. LOIS
SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, 106, 239–40 (1981).
60. Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
119, 122 (2004).
61. COLIN RHYS LOVELL, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 388–94 (1962);
SCHWOERER, supra note 59, at 87, 90–92; Laurence Claus, Methodology, Proportionality, Equality:
Which Moral Question Does the Eighth Amendment Pose?, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 37
(2008); Foote, supra note 32, at 967. As a drafter of the English Bill of Rights described it, judges
set bail so high “to elude the Benefit of the Laws made for the Liberty of the Subjects,” that they
were, in effect, “denying him the right to bail.” English Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.);
SCHWOERER, supra note 59, at 90.
62. See generally William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV. 33,
34–66 (1977).
63. Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, supra note 60, at 122.
64. See, e.g., Daw v. Swaine (1670) 88 Eng. Rep. 1195 (KB) (action for excessive bail); Neal v.
Spencer (1698) 88 Eng. Rep. 1305 (KB) (collecting cases that note the diversity of bail amounts
given for the same offense in an action for excessive bail); Parker v. Langley (1712) 88 Eng. Rep.
667 (QB) (action for excessive bail); King v. Bowes (1787) 99 Eng. Rep. 1327(KB) (allowing for a
“lessening” of bail, as there may be “difficulty” in procuring the sums).
65. WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 138–39 (8th ed.1824); see also
JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 88–89 (1819).
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aspect of liberty the English sought to protect.66
The clause was adopted almost verbatim in the American Bill of
Rights.67 It was a non-controversial provision that sparked almost no
debate.68 American history shows that the founders adopted the English
understanding of the clause.69 For federal cases, The Judiciary Act of 1789
conferred rights to bail proceedings in all federal criminal cases. 70 The
practice in the colonies was either very similar or even more in favor of the
pretrial release of the individual.71 Judges had little room to abuse their
discretion to set bail. When they did abuse their discretion in setting bail, it
was viewed as objectively excessive.72
66. Michael S. Woodruff, The Excessive Bail Clause: Achieving Pretrial Justice Reform
Through Incorporation, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 241, 290–92 (2013).
67. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”), with English Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. &
M., c. 2 (Eng.) (declaring that “excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”); see also Wiseman, Bail Reform Act, supra note 57,
at 127.
68. Only one delegate, Representative Samuel Livermore, spoke on it, saying, “The clause seems
to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to
have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who
are to be the judges?” 1 Annals of Cong. 782 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). The lack of
controversy may have stemmed from the well-understood principle of pretrial release dating back
centuries and present in colonial America. Foote, supra note 32, at 966–75; see also Duker, supra
note 62, at 33–60.
69. Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. 704, 710 (1835); United States v. Lawrence, 4 D.C. 518 (1835);
United States v. Brawner, 7 F. 86, 88–89 (W.D. Tenn. 1881); Jones v. Kelly, 17 Mass. 116, 116–17
(1821); Whiting v. Putnam, 17 Mass. 175, 175–78 (1821).
70. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789). It said that, for a noncapital defendant,
“bail shall be admitted,” and for a capital defendant, bail may be admitted. Id.
71. The Virginia and Massachusetts bills of rights prohibited excessive bail. VA. CONST. art. I, §
9 (“[E]xcessive bail ought not to be required”); MASS. CONST. art. XXVI (“[N]o . . . court of law,
shall demand excessive bail”). Pennsylvania and North Carolina used a definition that many 19th
century state constitutions copied: “All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for
capital offences, when the proof is evident, or presumption great.” PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 28; N.C.
CONST. OF 1776, §XXXIX.
72. SCHWOERER, supra note 59, at 87. One important feature to note is many colonial charters
guaranteed that individuals would enjoy the same liberties as Englishmen, and these charters would
be adopted when the colonies became states. Hermine Herta Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial
Detention, I, 60 GEO. L.J. 1139, 1163 (1972) (noting how state constitutions followed the pattern of
English law). Another feature of these bail clauses was that they were inalienable rights. Hegreness,
supra note 32, at 912. For all crimes that were not punishable by death, the right to bail was
automatic. Id.; cf. Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 422 (2016)
[hereinafter Wiseman, Fixing Bail] (observing some of the problems of the modern cash bail system
including the incentives judges have to detain defendants).
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One cannot properly understand or interpret this right to reasonable bail
without considering its origins and historical interpretation. In Boyle, the
Court described a “right to bail” as the “traditional right to freedom before
conviction,” and “[t]he right to release before trial conditioned upon the
accused’s giving adequate assurance.”73 Although a court may impose bail
conditions, the primary function of bail is to allow for pretrial release, while
making certain the individual accused of a crime will appear in court when
required.74 Historically, when people were charged with misdemeanors,
they had the right to release.75 For bail to be reasonable, the calculation
must be based on the character and circumstances of each individual who
comes before the judge—including their financial abilities.76
B. History of The Excessive Fines Clause
Similar to the right to be free from excessive bail, the history of the right
to be free from an excessive monetary sanction—which comes after one is
convicted—dates back to the Magna Carta.77 The Magna Carta was created
to “reduce arbitrary royal power.”78 The Magna Carta treated a fine that
would impoverish an individual as per se disproportionate.79 Parliament
confirmed and restated these principles many times during the thirteenth,
73. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1952).
74. Id. at 4–5; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752–54 (1987).
75. Shima Baradaran Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U. L. REV. 837, 863–
64 (2018) [hereinafter Baughman, History]. The founders intended the Excessive Bail Clause to
secure to American citizens the entire right as it existed in the English Bill of Rights and as the
Framers understood it. See A. E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA
AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 205–10, 233–49 (1968) (tracing the origins of the Bill of
Rights to the Magna Carta); 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 446–47, 467–68 (Jonathan Elliot 2d ed., 1836)
(statements of Patrick Henry and Edmond Randolph to Virginia Convention).
76. Stack, 342 U.S. at 5, 5 n.3 (“the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based
upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant,” including “the
financial ability of the defendant to give bail”). Pretrial release upholds the presumption of
innocence. Id. at 4.
77. The Court has referred to this as the “foundation of our English law heritage.” Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
78. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 270 (1989); JOHN
PHILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LIBERTY 99–
103 (2005); GOLDWIN ALBERT SMITH, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 129,
131 (1955).
79. Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CAL. L. REV. 277, 321 (2014).
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fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries.80 Yet despite the guarantees, those with
power continued to impose unaffordable fines on individuals—for reasons
including harassment—and would detain those unable to pay. 81
After the overthrow of the last Stuart king, Parliament sought to reaffirm
the Magna Carta’s protection from excessive fines once and for all. When
Parliament adopted the English Bill of Rights, it included an Excessive Fines
Clause which it crafted to prevent English from judges abusing their
power.82 When crafting the provision, the drafters made clear that they
sought to curb the pattern of imposing excessive fines—and doing so in an
“arbitrar[y], illegal[], and [biased]” manner.”83 As one commentator put it,
“[t]he great object [of the Excessive Fines Clause was that it ensured in] no
case could the offender be pushed absolutely to the wall: his means of
livelihood must be saved to him.”84
The earliest application of the excessive fines provision came less than a
year after its adoption, where the House of Lords reversed an excessive fine
the Court of King’s Bench had imposed on Lord Devonshire.85 The House
of Lords declared:

80. See FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA: ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH
CONSTITUTION, 1300–1629 10 (1948) (noting that Parliament reaffirmed the principles of the Magna
Carta at least thirty-seven times during the time prior to adoption of the English Bill of Rights); see
also Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester, Y.B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C.P. 1316), reprinted
in 52 THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 3 (1934).
81. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION, 1625–1660 210–12 (S.
Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed., 3rd ed. 1906). The excessive fines judges imposed with impunity
during the reigns of several monarchs, from Henry VII to Charles II, led to Parliament seeking to
make a lasting change. 2 LORD MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF
JAMES THE SECOND 3 (1848).
82. SCHWOERER, supra note 59, at 91.
83. SCHWOERER, supra note 59, at 91. The drafters further provided three examples of large
fines imposed upon disfavored individuals, in amounts so high that no individual could pay. 9 H.C.
Jour. 689–90 (1680) (“[I]t is the Opinion of this Committee, That the Court of King’s Bench, in the
Imposition of Fines on Offenders of late Years, hath acted arbitrarily, illegally, and partially”). As
one scholar has found, these individuals were not being fined for anything they did, but for who they
were. Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, supra note 60, at 139; see also WILLIAM
SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 287
(2d ed. 1914); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373 (1769)
(“[I]mprisonment . . . is better than an excessive fine, for [an excessive fine] amounts to
imprisonment for life.”).
84. MCKECHNIE, supra note 83, at 287.
85. 11 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1353–72 (T.B. Howell ed., 1811); State v.
Driver, 78 N.C. 423, 428 (1878).
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[T]hat the fine of 30,000 pounds imposed by the Court of King’s
Bench, upon the Earl of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant,
against Magna Charta, the common right of the subject and the law
of the land [partly because] the Judge may commit the party to
prison till the fine be paid, and withal set so great a fine as is
impossible for the party to pay . . . thus every man’s liberty is
wrested out of the dispose of the law and is stuck under the girdle of
the Judges.86
The ability to pay was an essential element in determining what
constitutes “excessiveness.”87
These English principles became deeply rooted in U.S. constitutional
thought and shaped the Eighth Amendment.88 Virginia became the first state
to adopt the language from the English Bill of Rights in its Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 1776.89 The drafters of the Constitution adopted the
Eighth Amendment almost verbatim from the Virginia Declaration of
Rights.90 Under these provisions, an individual had to be able to save his or
her “contenement”;91 in this way, the Virginia Declaration of Rights
prevented a judge from imposing fines so severe as to deprive an individual
the ability to secure the necessities of life.92

86. Driver, 78 N.C. at 428.
87. SCHWOERER, supra note 59, at 91; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at 373; Nicholas M.
McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause,
40 Hastings Const. L.Q. 833, 849 (2013).
88. Colgan, supra note 79, at 335 (finding that “the idea of saving defendants from persistent
impoverishment was a guiding principle reaching back to the days of the Magna Carta and the
English Bill of Rights, and enduring through the ratification of the Eighth Amendment”).
89. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688 (2019).
90. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266 (1989);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977); HOWARD, supra note 75, at 205–07; 1 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE MASON 71 (Robert Rutland ed. 1970). The Framers of the Eighth Amendment were
well aware of the reasonings for the adoption of the Excessive Fines Clause in the English Bill of
Rights.
91. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687.
92. 3 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 186 (1798); 2 HENRY HALLAM,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF HENRY VII TO THE DEATH
OF GEORGE II 34 (8th ed. 1867); THOMAS MADOX, THE HISTORY AND ANTIQUITIES OF THE
EXCHEQUER OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND IN TWO PERIODS 678 (1711); Calvin R. Massey, The
Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV.
1233, 1259–60 (1987); MCKECHNIE, supra note 83, at 287–93; McLean, supra note 87, at 854–74.
Blackstone’s observations also provide helpful insight. He noted the “reasonableness of fines in
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Other courts and commentators of the era similarly reflected this
understanding. For example, in 1799 the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals explained that any “fine or amercement ought to be according to the
degree of the fault and the estate of the defendant.”93 Commentator Thomas
Cooley recounted in his influential constitutional treatise that the Excessive
Fines Clause requires a fine to “have some reference to the party’s ability to
pay it.”94 Lawmakers also reiterated such an understanding.95
Even though the Court has rarely spoken on the Excessive Fines Clause,
it has observed that the Magna Carta limited the power of the government to
impose punitive fines.96 In Timbs, the most recent Supreme Court case to
reference the clause, the Court also cited with approval a statement from
Blackstone that “no man shall have a larger amercement imposed upon him,
than his circumstances or personal estate will bear.”97 The Court then went
on to instruct how to determine if a fine is excessive, beginning with
determining whether the fine acts as punishment.98 If the answer to this first
question is yes, the next focus turns on if the fine is “grossly disproportional
to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”99 Thus, the essence of the
constitutional inquiry lies in the principle of proportionality—the fine must
bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense.100 The Court’s citations
criminal cases has also been usually regulated by the determination of magna carta, concerning
amercements for misbehavior [he describes how the law requires] that no man shall have a larger
amercement imposed upon him, than his circumstances or personal estate will bear . . . .”
BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at 372. He then elaborated, explaining how the “ancient practice was
to enquire by a jury, when a fine was imposed upon any man, ‘quantum inde regi dare valeat per
annum, salva sustentatione sua, et uxoris, et liberorum suorum’” which translates to how much from
thence he be able to pay the King annually, having besides a maintenance for himself, his wife and
children. BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at 373.
93. Jones v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. 555, 557 (1799).
94. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 328 (1st ed. 1868).
95. McLean, supra note 87, at 884 (noting how one lawmaker stated a fine a fine must “be
determined from the condition of the man how much he could pay without touching the sustenance
of his wife and children.”).
96. Browning-Ferris Indus. Of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 271 (1989); see
also Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335.
97. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688 (2019).
98. Id. at 689; Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328–33; Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618
(1993); Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558–59 (1993); Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S.
at 275–76.
99. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.
100. Timbs, 139 S.Ct. at 689 (emphasizing that every state has “a constitutional provision
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in Timbs to the historical predecessors of the Excessive Fines Clause, as well
as the Court’s endorsement of considering a person’s ability to pay, provide
persuasive evidence that a fine that is more than a person can pay may be
“excessive.”
IV. ARGUMENT: MISDEMEANOR PRETRIAL DETENTION IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS-APPLIED
A. It Is Not Illegal to Be Poor
Arguably, a mandate that judges setting bail consider an individual’s
ability to pay is the clearest principle that came out of the treatment of the
Excessive Bail Clause in England and the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Excessive Fines Clause in Timbs. Concern with
arbitrary imprisonment by the government may explain why the Excessive
Fines Clause is coupled with—and appears right after—the Excessive Bail
Clause. The Clauses together serve the purpose of assuring judges set bail
with the individual’s ability to pay in mind.101 Judges unconstitutionally
intrude on an individual’s liberty interest when setting bail without any
meaningful process—causing the same injury as if it had simply ordered
detention outright.102 It would make no sense to permit the government to
prohibiting the imposition of excessive fines either directly or by requiring proportionality”).
101. To meet this standard, a court must determine what an individual can pay. Bearden v.
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983). If the bail is set beyond the individual’s means, the unaffordable
bail amount violates the Eighth Amendment unless the court determines that it is the least restrictive
means for a compelling state interest. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our
society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
exception.”). Yet currently, no process for evaluating a defendant’s ability to pay bail exists in most
states. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 72, at 445–46 (noting that such a process is nonexistent in
most places).
102. O’Donnell v. Harris Cnty., 892 F.3d 147, 158 (5th Cir. 2018). This is impermissibly overinclusive and under-inclusive. As to over-inclusiveness, the Supreme Court has recognized, “liberty
is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” Salerno,
481 U.S. at 755. In other words, the Constitution protects an individual’s liberty from government
intrusion. Yet wealth-based pretrial detention turns this principle on its head, allowing courts to
intrude on an individual’s liberty, in hopes of targeting the “bad apple” of misdemeanor defendants.
Wealth-based limits are also impermissibly under-inclusive. If an individual can pay bail, he or she
will be released. Also, if an individual pleads guilty to a crime, he or she will be released. This is
despite the obvious risk that such individuals may pose the same danger to the community as violent
individuals not granted bail. Consequently, if the government believed that certain individuals
needed monitoring or supervision to mitigate their risk of flight or dangerousness, those individuals
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take actions that would otherwise be unconstitutional simply because the
concerned individual is a pretrial detainee—in other words suggesting that
pretrial detainees have fewer constitutional rights than all other people. 103
After Timbs, judges may no longer set bail without considering a
defendant’s ability to pay.104 To do so would allow judges to place poor
individuals in indefinite pretrial detention solely because of who they are,
thus constituting the modern version of a punitive economic sanction. 105
For bail to be constitutional, it must be reasonable.106 Yet income data
would receive neither monitoring nor supervision when they are released by paying money bail or by
pleading guilty and receiving no jail time. Furthermore, the federal scheme provides an apt example.
The Bail Reform Act, provides judges with statutory guidelines if a defendant cannot afford bail.
See S. REP. 98-225, 16 (1984); see also SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A
COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2017) [hereinafter
BAUGHMAN, BAIL BOOK] (noting that the broken bail system is the “single most preventable cause
of mass incarceration in America”).
103. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) (concluding that “the State does not
acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has
secured a formal adjudication of guilt”); see generally Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in
THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 71 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017)
(exploring in detail the misdemeanor process’s pervasive disregard for basic criminal law and
procedural protections as well as its strong tendencies toward punishing the poor).
104. As the Court made clear in Timbs, these two clauses “place ‘parallel limitations’ on ‘the
power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of government.’” Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687
(quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263 (1989)).
The text and the historical context of the Excessive Fines and Excessive Bail Clauses lead to the
conclusion that the Eighth Amendment does not permit government action that imposes bail beyond
a defendant’s ability to pay. This is especially so since the Supreme Court “has long been sensitive
to the treatment of indigents in our criminal justice system.” Bearden, 461 U.S. at 664. Despite this
historical context, scholars continue to document bail’s widespread misuse. See ARTHUR L.
BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (1927); John W. Roberts & James S. Palermo, A Study of
the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693 (1958).
105. Such governmental actions contravene the United States’s “fundamental . . . scheme of
ordered liberty.” Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, in
ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 73 (Erik
Luna ed., 2017) (explaining the problems with the misdemeanor system); WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR.,
BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 11, 19 (1976) (“The American system of bail allows a person arrested for
a criminal offense the right to purchase his release pending trial. Those who can afford the price are
released; those who cannot remain in jail.”); Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 72, at 434 (noting
that most defendants awaiting trial in jail are not detained because they were found to be dangerous
or have a particularly high flight risk).
106. And reasonableness depends on whether bail is set “at a figure higher than an amount
reasonably calculated to” assure presence at trial. Stack, 342 U.S. at 5. Relatedly, the Supreme
Court’s reliance in Timbs on the history of the Excessive Fine Clause supports implementation of a
test of reasonableness that includes a consideration of the effects of the economic sanction on the
accused, rather than simply the value of bail. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688.
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reveals how unrealistic and non-individualized bail is set for many
individuals. As one study shows, “[t]he median bail bond amount . . .
represents eight months of income for the typical detained defendant.”107
Estimates also suggest that “over 60% of the people unable to post bail
bonds fall within the poorest third of society. 80% fall within the bottom
half.”108 Our criminal justice system has no legitimate purpose to
unnecessarily confine individuals accused of most misdemeanors.109 That is
essentially a punishment.110 And Bearden v. Georgia made clear that
imprisoning an indigent defendant because of inability to pay a fine violates
the Constitution.111
Wealth-based pretrial detention infringes on both protections afforded in
the Eighth Amendment. It also affects taxpayers and the state, as they bear

107. Rabuy & Kopf, supra note 26, at 2; see also Carlisle v. Landon, 73 S. Ct. 1179, 1182 (1953)
(noting that “a person may not be capriciously held. Requirement of bail in an amount that staggers
the imagination is obviously a denial of bail”).
108. Rabuy & Kopf, supra note 26, at 2 n.11; see also ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN,
MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS
POLICING 135 (2018) (noting the reality for many misdemeanor defendants in New York City is that
“bail means jail” due solely to the financial price they must otherwise pay).
109. Yet, in practice, these decisions face almost no scrutiny. Cf. Lauryn P. Gouldin, Reforming
Pretrial Decision-Making, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 857, 868 (2020) (noting in practice, that judges
enjoy “almost unreviewable discretion in making [bail] decisions”); Crystal S. Yang, Toward an
Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1415–16 (2017) (“Today, in most jurisdictions, bail
judges are granted vast discretion to make pre-trial release decisions that take into account [several]
factors”).
110. Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth
Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1304–05 (2012). Yet people in pretrial detention make
up nearly two-thirds of America’s jail population, and nearly 20% of the world’s pretrial jail
population. Connelly & Linthorst, supra note 32, at 141; Wendy Sawyer, How Race Impacts Who Is
Detained
Pretrial,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Oct. 9,
2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/10/09/pretrial_race/; Bail Reform: A Guide for State and
Local Policymakers, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM AT HARVARD L. SCH. 7 (2019),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey
=9a804d1d-f9be-e0f0-b7cd-cf487ec70339&forceDialog=0.
111. 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983) (“To . . . deprive [a person] of his conditional freedom simply
because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay . . . would be contrary to the fundamental
fairness required by the [Constitution].”). Consistent with this principle, the Court has rejected a
number of practices that punished indigent individuals with imprisonment because they were poor.
See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397–98 (1971) (inability to pay traffic fines); Williams v. Illinois,
399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970) (inability to pay criminal fine); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 711–
12 (1961) (inability to pay filing fee); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (inability to afford
trial transcript for appeal). This is especially true given the fact that conditions in jails are far worse
than in prisons nationwide. Baughman, History, supra note 75, at 876–77.
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the costly burden of housing and feeding those whom judges could safely
release.112 As one study found: “[P]retrial detention costs taxpayers $38
million per day, or $14 billion per year—an amount that could support the
employment of 250,000 elementary schoolteachers, the provision of free or
reduced-cost lunch for thirty-one million children, or the provision of shelter
and services for the country’s 50,000 homeless veterans . . . .”113 Moreover,
courts dismiss most misdemeanor charges—so the cost of detaining these
individuals is almost worthless to the public.114 As an example, the state of
California spent almost $40 million in only six counties over two years by
jailing individuals who either were never charged or whose charges courts
dropped or dismissed.115
On any given night, about 450,000 people are in jail awaiting trial—
solely because they are poor.116 And overcrowding is one of the most
serious problems facing American jails.117 Such a system turns the
presumption of innocence and prohibition against the infliction of
112. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687, 689 (explaining that “[e]xorbitant tolls undermine other
constitutional liberties,” and that the excessive fines clause places “parallel limitations” on “the
power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of government”); see also Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (explaining that an individual “may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law”).
113. CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD & HENRY F. FRADELLA, PUNISHING POVERTY: HOW BAIL
AND PRETRIAL DETENTION FUEL INEQUALITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 147 (2019).
Some think this number is too low. See generally Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial
Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2017) [hereinafter Baughman, Pretrial Detention] (finding that the
savings could reach an estimated $78 billion a year).
114. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L. REV. 947, 1012 (2020)
[hereinafter Baughman, Bail Reform].
115. “Not in It for Justice”: How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly
Punishes
Poor
People,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
3
(Apr. 11,
2017),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/04/11
/not-it-justice/how-californias-pretrial-detention-and-bail-system-unfairly; see also Schnacke, supra
note 32, at 15 (finding that “the United States Department of Justice estimates that keeping the
pretrial population behind bars costs American taxpayers roughly 9 billion dollars per year”).
116. Challenging the Money Bail System, C.R. CORPS, https://www.civilrightscorps.org/work/
wealth-based-detention (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
117. MICHAEL MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 77 (5th ed., 2017). This has led to the problem
of “deteriorating housing facilities, lack of access to appropriate services, a shortage of properly
trained staff, and increases in victimization for both staff and inmates.” See Wendy R. Calaway &
Jennifer M. Kinsley, Rethinking Bail Reform, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 795, 805 (2018); see also
Appleman, supra note 110, at 1301–02. Moreover, the pretrial detention of nonviolent,
misdemeanor offenders largely drives this overcrowding. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1314 n.7 (2012) [hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanors I].
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punishment before conviction on its head.118 Pretrial detention solely
because of indigent status clearly violates the Constitution.119
As the Supreme Court has instructed:
To determine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes
impermissible punishment or permissible regulation . . . the
punitive/regulatory distinction turns on whether an alternative
purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned [to it].120
Where a court determines the accused is not a danger to the community
or a flight risk, no alternative purpose requiring detention exists. 121 Thus
detaining the indigent while the wealthy go free far exceeds what is
reasonably necessary to assure presence in court.
Such pretrial detention places individuals at a significant disadvantage
in defending their cases in the vast majority of instances. 122 Time is not of

118. Baughman, History, supra note 75, at 845–46. This prohibition on punishment before
conviction applies with special force in the context of cash bail. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687;
United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 716 (1990); Walker v. City of Calhoun, GA,
901 F.3d 1245, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2018); Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056–57 (5th Cir.
1978); accord In re Humphrey, 482 P.3d 1008, 1015–19 (Cal. 2021); State v. Pratt, 166 A.3d 600,
607 (Vt. 2017); State v. Brown, 338 P.3d 1276, 1292 (N.M. 2014).
119. See, e.g., Griffen v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19–20 (1951) (vacating and remanding an Illinois
Supreme Court case that had denied a petitioner review of his trial transcript simply because he was
too poor to pay for the stenographer, and such a classification was invidious). It also runs afoul of
the Constitution because a pretrial detention requirement is not necessary to provide reasonable
assurance of appearance at court. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). Any
requirement in excess of the amount necessary to ensure a defendant’s presence in court is inherently
punitive. Appleman, supra note 110, at 1303; see also Darcel D. Clark et al., Why We Need to
Reform New York’s Criminal Justice Reforms, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/opinion/new-york-bail-reform.html (advocating for New York
to adopt bail reforms like New Jersey’s, which limit the use of cash bail).
120. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
121. See id. (holding that “preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal” but
failing to state that the state would have a legitimate regulatory interest beyond that). Setting bail
which places poor individuals in pretrial detention as a punishment before conviction is contrary to
the concept of “ordered liberty.” Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689; see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5
(1951).
122. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532–533 (1972); see also O’Donnell v. Harris Cnty., 251 F.
Supp. 3d 1052, 1106 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Shima Baradaran Baughman et al., Reforming State Bail
Reform, 74 SMU L. REV. 447, 448 (2021).
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the essence when resolving misdemeanor cases.123 The individual’s access
to counsel is significantly limited, and he or she is less able to prepare a
defense.124 As one scholar notes, “the misdemeanor system propels
defendants through in bulk with scant attention to individualized cases and
often without counsel.”125 Even worse, misdemeanors represent nearly
three-quarters of all criminal charges in the United States.126 Similarly,
pretrial detention can last a long time—longer than the maximum sentence
which the statute would otherwise authorize for the crime.127
123. Natapoff, Misdemeanors I, supra note 117, at 1315 (“While these individuals are largely
ignored by the criminal literature and policymakers, they are nevertheless punished, stigmatized, and
burdened by their convictions in many of the same ways as their felony counterparts.”).
“Misdemeanor defendants are especially impacted by delayed . . . appearance procedures.” Pamela
R. Metzger & Janet C. Hoeffel, Criminal (Dis)appearance, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 392, 411 (2020);
see also Benjamin Weiser & James C. McKinley Jr., Chronic Bronx Court Delays Deny Defendants
Due
Process,
Suit
Says,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May 10,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/nyregion/chronic-bronx-court-delays-deny-defendants-dueprocess-suit-says.html (“Defendants charged with misdemeanors in the Bronx regularly see their
cases languish far past the 60- and 90-day speedy trial limits set down in state law for various lowlevel offenses . . . . Defendants who wish to go to trial must often wait years and sometimes never
get their day in court, a 2013 study showed. . . . Misdemeanor defendants must wait on average
642 days for a bench trial and 827 days for a jury trial in the Bronx . . . [and] over 500 misdemeanor
cases had been pending for more than two years.”).
124. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985) (“[T]o deprive a person of counsel during the
period prior to trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself.”). Douglas
J. Klein, The Pretrial Detention “Crisis”: The Causes and the Cure, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 281, 294 (1997) (noting that “pretrial detainees[] may be incarcerated in facilities far
away from the district in which they are tried[, which] can inhibit a defense attorney from consulting
with the pretrial detainee”). And there is no individualized substantive assessment of an individual’s
risk of not appearing. Since there is no legitimate government interest in such a system, courts “may
infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment . . . inflicted upon detainees qua
detainees.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979); see also Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689; Alexandra
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 255, 256 (2015) [hereinafter Natapoff,
Misdemeanors II] (describing misdemeanors as “dominated by police arrest practices and assemblyline processing”). This violates individual liberties secured by the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51 (considering how to balance government interest in community safety
and crime prevention against individuals’ interest in liberty); United States v. Montalvo-Murillo,
495 U.S. 711, 716 (1990) (“[W]e recognize that a vital liberty interest is at stake.”); Stack, 342 U.S.
at 4.
125. Natapoff, Misdemeanors I, supra note 117, at 1315; see also Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication
of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157, 1172–74 (2004) (describing the
unconstitutional conditions of the New York misdemeanor system).
126. Sandra G. Mayson & Megan T. Stevenson, Misdemeanors by the Numbers, 61 B.C. L. REV.
971, 1015 (2020).
127. Nothing is more ironic than that. See Baughman, History, supra note 75, at 874–75; Robert
C. Boruchowitz et al., Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of America’s Broken
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For example, in 2010, Kalief Browder, a sixteen-year-old boy accused
of stealing a backpack, spent more than 1000 days in pretrial detention,
including 800 days in solitary confinement, without ever having a trial. 128 In
2018, a homeless man spent almost a year in pretrial detention for stealing
$5.00 and a bottle of cologne, without ever receiving a trial.129 In Texas, a
sixty-one-year-old great-grandmother died in pretrial detention after
spending nearly five months awaiting trial for a misdemeanor trespassing. 130
In Louisiana, law enforcement can detain individuals on misdemeanor
charges for at least thirty days without ever even scheduling an
arraignment.131 In Georgia, police charged a man with a misdemeanor for
jumping a subway turnstile to evade a $1.75 fare.132 Doing so landed him in
pretrial detention for fifty-four days—far longer than the maximum sentence
he could have received if convicted—before the court appointed a lawyer for
him.133 Those who suffer pretrial detainment are often desperate to resolve
their cases to escape the lengthy and often dangerous—even deadly—
Misdemeanor Courts,
NAT’L
ASS’N OF CRIM.
DEF.
LAWS.
18–19
(2009),
https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/20b7a219-b631-48b7-b34a-2d1cb758bdb4/minor-crimesmassive-waste-the-terrible-toll-of-america-s-broken-misdemeanor-courts.pdf; Alisa Smith et al.,
Testing the Effects of A Prosecutor Policy Recommending No-Money Release for Nonviolent
Misdemeanor Defendants, 48 AM. J. CRIM. L. 43, 51 (2020); Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial
Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1356 (2014) [hereinafter Wiseman,
Pretrial Detention]; William Glaberson, In Misdemeanor Cases, Long Waits for Elusive Trials, N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr. 30,
2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/nyregion/justice-denied-formisdemeanor-cases-trials-are-elusive.html. Detention can last quite a while. Moving Beyond
Money: A Primer on Bail Reform, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM AT HARVARD L. SCH. 6–7 (2016),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/cjpp/FINAL-Primer-on-Bail-Reform.pdf; Paul Heaton et al., The
Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 721 (2017);
Wiseman, Pretrial Detention, supra, at 1354 (noting that “despite speedy trial requirements, many
defendants awaiting trial are detained for months”).
128. See Johnson, supra note 19, at 30; see also Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law: A Boy Was
Accused of Taking a Backpack. The Courts Took the Next Three Years of His Life, NEW YORKER
(Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law.
129. Bob Egelko, Homeless Man Couldn’t Afford $330,000 Bail, So Judge Orders Him Free For
Now, S.F. GATE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Home-less-man-couldn-tafford-330-000-bail-so-12753950.php.
130. Dotson v. Bexar Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 2019 WL 6311375, at *1–2 (W.D. Tex. 2019).
131. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 701(C) (2022).
132. Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1032 (2006).
133. Id. at 1032. In 2015, an 18-year-old boy was held in pretrial detention for almost two months
when he was the victim in the case because he was too poor to afford bail. Connelly & Linthorst,
supra note 32, at 143. Six weeks after being stabbed, charges were dropped because no evidence
existed that he committed any crime. Connelly & Linthorst, supra note 32, at 143.
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conditions in jail.134
Moreover, there is no such thing as a low-stakes pretrial detention.135
Pretrial detention causes adverse outcomes in the case.136 Sentences can be
twice as long for individuals who cannot afford bail.137 Wealth-based

134. Mihir Zaveri, Harris County to Place Public Defenders at Bail Hearings, HOUS. CHRON.
(Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/HarrisCounty-to-place-public-defenders-at-bail-11002089.php (finding that just n Harris County alone,
“55 people died in pre-trial detention from 2009 to 2015, including defendants arrested for
misdemeanors such as trespassing.”). The issues are somewhat profound, as illness and suicide are
the two leading causes of death in jail. Figures for 2014 (the most recent year), show the highest
level of suicide in jail in nearly two decades, almost 5 times higher than in the general population.
Margaret E. Noonan, Mortality in Local Jails, 2000–2014 – Statistical Tables, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE 2 (Dec. 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mlj0014st.pdf.
135. Pretrial detention poses significant harm to individuals. Arpit Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs
of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 487-97 (2016) (finding
in an empirical study of the bail systems in two large cities that pretrial detention increases
conviction likelihood, does not significantly reduce nonappearance, and increases future crime);
Nick
Pinto,
The
Bail
Trap,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug. 13,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html (exploring the collateral effects
resulting from poor defendants’ inability to pay bail).
136. Heaton et al., supra note 127, at 715, 742–743 (“[P]retrial detention causally increases the
likelihood of conviction, the likelihood of receiving a carceral sentence, [and] the length of a
carceral sentence . . . .”); see also Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on
Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM.
ECON. REV. 201, 204 (2018); Mary T. Phillips, Bail, Detention, & Nonfelony Case Outcomes,
N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY 5 (2007), https://www.nycja.org/publications/brief-no-14-baildetention-nonfelony-case-outcomes. As an example, the Bail Project, a non-profit that pays bail for
indigent defendants, notes that in half of the cases where they pay bail, charges are dismissed—yet
of those who remain in pretrial detention, 90% plead guilty. See Why Bail?, THE BAIL PROJECT,
https://bailproject.org/why-bail/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2022).
137. See, e.g., Heaton et al., supra note 127, at 747; Meghan Sacks & Alissa R. Ackerman, Bail
and Sentencing: Does Pretrial Detention Lead to Harsher Punishment, 25 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV.
59, 62 (2014); Marian R. Williams, The Effect of Pretrial Detention on Imprisonment Decisions,
28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 299, 313–14 (2003). As one court found:
The credible, reliable, and well-supported testimony of the witnesses and the
statistical studies in the record overwhelmingly prove that thousands of
misdemeanor defendants [in Harris County] each year are voluntarily pleading
guilty knowing that they are choosing a conviction with fast release over
exercising their right to trial at the cost of prolonged detention.
O’Donnell v. Harris Cnty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1107 (S.D. Tex. 2017); see also Heaton et al.,
supra note 127, at 715, 718–28 (discussing studies that have found that pretrial detention causes
these adverse results, rather than other variables). Other drastic consequences are also prevalent.
See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1972) (describing possible consequences of jail time:
“[i]t often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; . . . it enforces idleness; [and it hinders an
individual] in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense.”);
see also Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention, ARNOLD
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pretrial detention also inflicts unnecessary harm on families and
communities.138 These consequential effects are greatest for individuals
detained before trial on misdemeanors.139
Additionally, prosecutors hold significant power over whether and when
to file or drop charges, offer plea deals, and set hearings.140 This power
FOUNDATION
3
(2013),
https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/LJAF_Report_hidden-costs_
FNL.pdf (discussing how pretrial detention often increases the risk that defendants will commit
further crimes); Amanda Petteruti & Nastassia Walsh, Jailing Communities: The Impact of Jail
Expansion and Effective Jail Expansion and Public Safety Strategies, JUST. POL’Y INSTITUTE 3
(2008), https://justicepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/08-04_rep_jailing
communities_ac.pdf (asserting that incarceration negatively impacts mental and physical health and
family dynamics); Appleman, supra note 110, at 1319–20 (emphasizing the burden incarceration
places on a defendant’s family); Shima Baradaran Baughman & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting
Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 555 (2012) (noting the negative financial consequences of
incarceration); Megan Comfort, “A Twenty-Hour-a-Day Job”: I Impact of Frequent Low-Level
Criminal Justice Involvement on Family Life, 665 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 63, 67
(2016) (“Jail stays of several weeks are long enough to cause evictions for nonpayment of rent,
suspensions of government entitlements such as food stamps and SSI, and the loss of
possessions . . . .”); Connelly & Linthorst, supra note 32, at 143 (providing examples of the
economic burdens incarceration can impose on family members); Dobbie et al., supra note 136,
at 204 (explaining the lasting impact conviction has on employment); Johnson, supra note 19, at 31
(summarizing negative consequences of pretrial detention); Wiseman, Pretrial Detention, supra note
127, at 1356–57 (“Many detainees lose their jobs even if jailed for a short time, and this deprivation
can continue after the detainee’s release.”).
138. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975); AMANDA PETTERUTI & NASTASSIA WALSH,
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, JAILING COMMUNITIES: THE EFFECT OF JAIL EXPANSION AND EFFECTIVE
PUBLIC SAFETY STRATEGIES 17 (2008) (noting that “only 25 percent of children are able to stay in
the custody of their father when their mother is sent to jail”); Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the
Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1297, 1320 (2012) (finding that “[f]amily members of the person in jail experience not only
emotional and economic hardships, but . . . also physical ailments and declining health”); Megan
Comfort, A Twenty-Hour-a-Day Job: the effect of Frequent Low-Level Criminal Justice Involvement
on Family Life, 665 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 1, 5 (2016) (“Jail stays of several weeks are
long enough to cause evictions for nonpayment of rent, suspensions of government entitlements such
as food stamps and SSI, and the loss of possessions.”); Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and
the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1356–57 (2014) (“Many detainees lose their jobs
even if jailed for a short time, and . . . [w]ithout income, the defendant and his family also may fall
behind on payments and lose housing, transportation, and other basic necessities.”). This presents an
individual with an impossible choice: plead guilty and go home, or plead not guilty and stay in jail.
See John Raphling, Plead Guilty, Go Home. Plead Not Guilty, Stay in Jail, L.A. TIMES: OPINION
(May 17, 2017, 4 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-raphling-bail-20170517story.html.
139. Yang, supra note 109, at 1424.
140. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611,
643–53 (2014) (exploring prosecutorial discretion in misdemeanor case-handling). Research shows
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manifests itself when a prosecutor offers detained individuals the
opportunity to go home immediately simply by pleading guilty—rather than
staying in jail for months (or sometimes years) to fight the case.141 What is
more concerning, prosecutors purposely use this plea-inducing tactic to drive
conviction numbers up.142 With the tolls of pretrial detention well in the
mind of the accused, pleading guilty seems to be the inevitable decision—in
fact, the one only an irrational person would turn down.143 Yet misdemeanor
an increase in guilty pleas among individuals who wanted to shorten their stays in jail but who
otherwise would have had their charges dropped, had viable defenses (or would have had a viable
defense if out of detention), or would in all likelihood have been found not guilty. See Lindsey
Devers,
Bail
Decisionmaking,
BUREAU
OF
JUST.
ASSISTANCE
2
(2011),
https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/BailDecisionmakingResearchSum
mary.pdf; Gupta et al., supra note 135, at 2–5; Heaton et al., supra note 127, at 747; see generally
Dobbie et al., supra note 136; Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial
Detention on Case Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. & ECON. 529
(2017); Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case
Outcomes, 34 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 511 (2018).
141. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention, supra note 127, at 1356 (“In some cases, the periods that
defendants spend in jail awaiting trial is comparable to, or even greater than, their potential
sentences, thus substantially incentivizing quick plea deals regardless of guilt or innocence.”
(emphasis added)); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1136–37 (2008)
(“If the defendant can get a plea to a misdemeanor and time served, then the process constitutes the
whole punishment. Any plea that frees this defendant may be more than advisable—it may be
salvation. No matter how certain of acquittal, she is better off pleading guilty.”).
142. Prosecutors are incentivized to secure quick and efficient convictions. BENJAMIN H.
BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, REBOOTING JUSTICE: MORE TECHNOLOGY, FEWER LAWYERS, AND
THE FUTURE OF LAW 86 (2017); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF
PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 103 (1978); cf. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71, 81 (1992) (“The statute [at issue in Salerno] carefully limited the circumstances under which
detention could be sought . . . and was narrowly focused on a particularly acute problem in which the
government interests are overwhelming. . . . [T]he duration of confinement . . . was strictly
limited.”).
143. Ram Subramanian et al., Incarceration’s Front Door: The Misuse of Jails in America, VERA
INSTITUTE OF JUST. 38–40 (2015), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/incarcerationsfront-door-report_02.pdf; BAUGHMAN, BAIL BOOK, supra note 102, at 84; Heaton et al., supra note
127, at 714; see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2492–93 (2004) (“The pretrial detention can approach or even exceed the punishment
that a court would Impose after trial. So even an acquittal at trial can be a hollow victory . . . .”);
Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its
Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1364–65 (2000) (explaining that if a defendant is able to
get out if he pleads guilty but remains in jail indefinitely if he does not, “we confront the disturbing
possibility that he is being threatened with additional punishment precisely because he is both
innocent and naïve or stubborn or principled enough to insist upon a trial to establish that fact”);
Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach,
2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 85–86 (1995) (“Many defendants, especially first offenders, will agree to
almost anything to get out of jail.”). This occurs even though they are demonstrably innocent.
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pretrial detention as a bargaining chip against the indigent is unquestionably
disproportional.144
Perhaps the most noteworthy of the flaws of this system is the fact that it
does not protect the public; in fact, it makes the community less safe.145
Studies have shown that as little as two days in pretrial detention increases
the likelihood that an individual will commit a crime in the future and
increases the future risk level of even low-risk individuals.146
B. It Is Unconstitutional to Punish Poverty
As demonstrated above, court routinely impose bail at rates indigent
defendants just cannot afford to pay, with amounts significantly “higher than
an amount reasonably calculated to” assure the individuals’ presence in
court.147 In Timbs v. Indiana, the Court held that an economic sanction can
be excessive if it is “grossly disproportionate to the gravity of [the
defendant’s] offense . . . .”148 And in Stack v. Boyle, the Court held “[b]ail
set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to [assure
Alexandra Natapoff, Negotiating Accuracy: DNA in the Age of Plea Bargaining, in WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 85–
96 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017); Boruchowitz et al., supra note 127, at 8; Baughman, History,
supra note 75, at 872; Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REV. 485, 494 (2000).
This violates our most basic notions about fairness and justice. See NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT
WITHOUT CRIME, supra note 25, at 150-70 (discussing the many consequences of pretrial detention
for such low-level offenses and its centrality to the incarceration mindset); see also Russell M. Gold,
Paying for Pretrial Detention, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1255, 1271 (2020).
144. See NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME, supra note 25, at 53–54; Baughman, History,
supra note 75, at 872.
145. The current system decimates communities. BAUGHMAN, BAIL BOOK, supra note 102, at 77–
92; Lars H. Anderson, How Children’s Educational Outcomes and Criminality Vary by Duration
and Frequency of Paternal Incarceration, 665 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 149, 149–50
(2016); Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 612–30 (2017).
146. Schnacke, supra note 32, at 15–16; Lowenkamp et al., supra note 137, at 3 (finding that
“[w]hen held 2–3 days, low-risk defendants are almost 40% more likely to commit new crimes
before trial than equivalent defendants held no more than 24 hours”); Heaton et al., supra note 127,
at 768 (concluding after a study that “[w]hile pretrial detention clearly exerts a protective effect in
the short run, for misdemeanor defendants it may ultimately service to compromise public safety”).
147. Stack, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951); cf. Wiseman, Bail Reform Act, supra note 57, at 140, 140 n.104
(arguing that despite courts not being required to “set bail at an amount that defendants can actually
afford,” at least two circuits “have held that if the defendant protests that the trial court has set bail
higher than he can pay, the trial court must provide a reasoned explanation for its arrival at the
disputed figure”).
148. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688 (2019).
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presence at trial violates the] Eighth Amendment.”149 Because the moneybail systems in many states fail to account for individuals’ ability to pay,
these states have cash bail systems that function as punitive economic
sanctions.
If a judge does not consider an individual’s ability to pay, the judge
cannot possibly know whether the bail he or she set in a particular case
operates as the functional equivalent of a pretrial detention order.
Furthermore, detaining an individual whom the judge has already deemed
safe to return to the community provides insufficient respect to the
individual’s fundamental right to be free from wealth-based detention as
well as the fundamental right to pretrial liberty.150
At a minimum, courts must develop a process for deciding whether an
individual is indigent and can pay the bail the court will impose. The
process must occur within a reasonable amount of time after arrest. If the
individual is indigent and cannot pay bail, the court must then consider
whether any reasonable alternatives exist to assure reappearance.151 Since
these are individuals whom courts have already deemed safe to return to the
community, courts can release the vast majority of them without any

149. Stack, 342 U.S. at 5.
150. See, e.g., U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987) (holding that the government’s
narrowly tailored purpose in preventing dangerous individuals from being released into the
community on bail met the difficult standard for depriving a person of pretrial liberty). If one
believes that pretrial detention helps protect society in certain circumstances, using an outdated
model of pretrial detention offends faith in the system as a whole. There can be no dispute that
individual liberty is paramount when determining bail. See id. at 750 (“On the other side of the
scale, of course, is the individual’s strong interest in liberty.”). Judges disregard this consideration
when they do not make individualized assessments, especially given that state legislatures afford
alleged misdemeanants far fewer procedural rights than those accused of felonies. See, e.g.,
Blaisdell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. App. 1985) (noting that the
disparate treatment of felonies and misdemeanors is a “legislative recognition that the public
concerns served by warrantless misdemeanor arrests are in some degree outweighed by concerns for
personal security and liberty”); Minn. R. Crim. Proc. 26.01 (codifying that people who commit mere
“petty misdemeanors” are not entitled to a jury trial); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74
(1979) (holding that misdemeanant who was not subject to “actual imprisonment” upon a conviction
was not entitled to counsel). However, in many states, felonies and misdemeanors are not treated
with an understanding of this distinction. See Baughman, Bail Reform, supra note 114, at 1024; see
also Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal
Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 282 (2011).
151. See generally Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, (1951) (discussing how “the function of bail is
limited” and must be confined to “assuring the presence of that [particular] defendant”).
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conditions.152 Without a revised process, millions of individuals will
continue to face a misdemeanor criminal justice system that is both
fundamentally unfair and incompatible with constitutional imperatives. 153
The need for such a process emanates directly from the essential nature
of physical liberty the Constitution guarantees. Bail, like other protections
of the criminal justice system—such as the presumption of innocence and
the mandate of proof beyond a reasonable doubt—should deny the
government the power to punish simply based on allegations.154 Cash bail,
in practice, dilutes the sanctity of justice. The individual loses so much, and
society gains little.155
Further, it is rarely the case that pretrial detention is the least restrictive
means of assuring presence at court. To begin with, very few individuals
even pose a significant enough risk to warrant detention. For example, most
nonappearance is not due to willful flight; rather, it stems from lack of
adequate notice of court dates, inability to miss work, or lack of

152. Without such a process, these bail schemes run afoul of the Eighth Amendment. Only a clear
and compelling state interest can justify such an intrusion on individual liberty, and punishing
poverty is not one. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) (concluding that a “court
must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an
incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose . . . . Thus, if a particular condition or
restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does
not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’”). However, after a judge already has determined that
an individual is not a flight risk, see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544 (1952), nor a danger to
the community, see Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755, the only question that remains left to be answered is
whether the bail is set at an amount “higher than an amount reasonably calculated” to receive
adequate assurances that the accused will stand trial. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). If the
amount is not reasonably calculated, the bail amount would be viewed as “excessive” under the
Eighth Amendment. Stack, 342 U.S. at 5. If judges make no inquires as to an individual’s ability to
pay the bail imposed, the judge has no way of knowing whether the amount is one which provides
“adequate assurances. Rather, the bail determination is “is arbitrary or purposeless”. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979); see also Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir.
2004); Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1045–47 (9th Cir. 2002); Brogsdale v. Barry, 926 F.2d
1184, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1991) Union Cnty. Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 992 (3d Cir.
1983).
153. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752–53 (1987); O’Donnell v. Harris Cnty., 892 F.3d
147, 162–63 (5th Cir. 2018); cf. BAUGHMAN, BAIL BOOK, supra note 102, at 41, 195.
154. See Stack, 342 U.S. at 7–8 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“bail . . . is not a device for
keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial. On the
contrary, the spirit of the procedure is to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial has found them
guilty.”).
155. Baughman, Pretrial Detention, supra note 113, at 5–7.
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transportation, to name a few reasons.156 And for those few who do pose a
flight risk, alternative conditions—such as electronic monitoring, regular
check-ins, community housing, and drug and alcohol treatment—are usually
sufficient to mitigate such risks.157 In fact, some jurisdictions currently rely
on nonmonetary conditions and are often more efficient at assuring
appearances as well as protecting the community.158
Kentucky provides a good example. In 2011, Kentucky reformed its
pretrial detention system.159 The legislature adopted a bill that requires
pretrial services to use a valid risk-assessment tool to measure the
individual’s likelihood of returning for trial without threatening the public at
large; and if the individual is deemed to be low risk, he or she must be
released on their own recognizance unless the judge handling the matter
finds that release is not appropriate.160 After the legislature enacted the law,
the number of individuals released on unsecured bonds increased by about
15%, which also correlated with court appearance rates rising to over
90%.161 Other studies have shown similar results, casting doubt on the
proposition that cash bail systems are necessary to promote public safety or
assure appearance at court.162 For example, D.C. releases nearly all arrestees

156. Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 729–36 (2018).
157. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention, supra note 127, at 1364–72; see also Connelly & Linthorst,
supra note 32, at 150–55 (describing several alternatives to cash bail).
158. Pretrial Justice: How Much Does It Cost?, PRETRIAL JUST. INSTITUTE 5 (2017),
https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Malloy-Archive/Reimagining-Justice/Reimagining-Justice---Pretrialjustice-at-what-cost-PJI-2017.pdf (estimating that “implementing validated, evidence-based risk
assessment to guide pretrial release decisions could yield $78 billion in savings and benefits,
nationally”). Some nonmonetary conditions include: unsecured bonds, phone and text message
reminders, rides to court, and home confinement. The D.C. Pretrial Services Agency: Lessons From
Five Decades of Innovation and Growth, PRETRIAL JUST. INSTITUTE 6 (2020),
https://www.psa.gov/sites/default/files/PJI-DCPSACaseStudy.pdf
159. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2011).
160. Id.
161. Pretrial
Reform
in
Kentucky,
PRETRIAL
SERVS.
16–17
(2013),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey
=95c0fae5-fe2e-72e0-15a2-84ed28155d0a&forceDialog=0; Kamala D. Harris & Rand Paul, Kamala
Harris and Rand Paul: To Shrink Jails, Let's Reform Bail, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (July 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/opinion/kamala-harris-and-rand-paul-lets-reform-bail.html
(noting Kentucky’s use of risk assessments as an example of best practices in bail determinations).
162. Colorado is another example. Researchers found that 97% of individuals who were judged to
be low risk and granted unsecured bail attended all court appearances. Michael R. Jones, Unsecured
Bonds: The As Effective and Most Efficient Pretrial Release Option, PRETRIAL JUST. INSTITUTE 11
(2013), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
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pretrial, and in every year between 2011 and 2017, at least 98% of those
arrestees released avoided arrest for a violent crime.163 States must address
these unconstitutional systems that plague society and leave many
individuals in an unbelievable position. The Constitution requires more.
V. CONCLUSION
When judges set bail far beyond an individual’s ability to pay, it is the
functional equivalent of a detention order. Every year, hundreds of
thousands of individuals are jailed indefinitely without having been
convicted of a single crime. The evidence this article has presented
establishes a few things. First, courts can impose pretrial detention when it
serves one of two legitimate state interests: (1) to ensure an individual will
show up to all court proceedings; or (2) to ensure an individual does not
pose a danger to the community. Second, individuals have a fundamental
right to pretrial release.164 Wealth-based pretrial detention is not a legitimate

FileKey=87a896e2-5ab4-8123-b044-b84fba86e131&forceDialog=0. For individuals who were
deemed to be a moderate risk, yet were still granted unsecured bail, researchers found that 87%
appeared at all court appearances. Id. In both studies, the rate of appearance was higher than when
the individuals were given secured bail. Id.; see also Claire M. B. Brooker, Yakima County,
Washington Pretrial Justice System Improvements: Pre- and Post-Implementation Analysis, JUST.
SYS. PARTNERS 6 (2017) (finding a significant increase in the number of arrestees released pretrial
with no statistically significant difference in court appearance and public safety outcomes.); Glenn
A. Grant, Report to the Governor and the Legislature, N.J. CTS. 14 (2018),
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf (finding that in New Jersey court
appearance rates remained above 89% after the state reformed its criminal justice system—
significantly limiting the use of cash bail). Illinois is another example. Under a recent statute that
takes effect January 1, 2023, pretrial release for individuals charged with misdemeanors will be the
rule, not the exception. H.B. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 110-1.5, 110-10(b) (Ill. 2021).
163. Congressional Budget Justification and Performance Budget Request: Fiscal Year 2019,
PRETRIAL
SERVS.
AGENCY
FOR
D.C.
27
(2018),
https://www.psa.gov/sites/default/files/FY2019%20PSA%20Congressional%20Budget%20Justificat
ion.pdf; see also Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal
Sentencing, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1130 (2018). San Francisco provides another good example.
The city eliminated cash bail—resulting in the city’s jail population decreasing by 47% and the rate
of new criminal activity by people awaiting trial being only 10%. See Tiana Herring, Releasing
People Pretrial Doesn’t Harm Public Safety, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/11/17/pretrial-releases/; see also Jordan Gross, Devil Take
the Hindmost: Reform Considerations for States with A Constitutional Right to Bail, 52 AKRON L.
REV. 1043, 1079 (2018) (discussing how numerous jurisdictions have successfully changed their
laws, minimizing money bail).
164. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
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practice—as it does not serve one of the two legitimate state interests,
constitutes an unconstitutional intrusion on a fundamental liberty interest,
and hurts all poor defendants charged with misdemeanors.
This Essay offers a new way to think about wealth-based detention and
suggests some ways the states can confront these unjust systems of pretrial
detention. Society is best served if states address the evils of wealth-based
pretrial detention. And courts and legislatures must always remember,
“liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the
carefully limited exception.”165

165. Id.
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